This article examines how the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. We use an agent-based computational model to analyze the polarization-conflict relationship when ethnicity is "fixed"-salient for every member of two nominally rival ethnic groups-and when ethnic salience is "variable"-permitted to vary across individuals within groups as a function of relative income. Our results indicate that: (i) when ethnic salience is fixed, conflict onset is more than twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary, with the difference decreasing at high levels of polarization;
Introduction
How is the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience-the importance that individuals attach to ethnicity, one among several components of an identity repertoire? Measures of ethnic polarizationthe probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups weighted by the relative size of each group-are commonly used to summarize the ethnic landscape of an entire country (Reynal-Querol 2002; ReynalQuerol 2005a, 2005b; Esteban and Ray 2008) . The use of this summary statistic effectively assumes that ethnic salience is constant across individuals-that the depth of ethnic cleavages displays no spatial or temporal variation, independent of changes in the relative size of ethnic groups (Bossuroy 2006, Norris and Mattes 2003; Posner 2004b ).
Yet, empirical evidence would suggest otherwise.
A key question from rounds 1 and 2 of the Afrobarometer Survey-to our knowledge, the only individual-level, multi-country, multi-round survey of its kind in the African context-gauges the relative salience respondents attach to different group identities, one of which is ethnicity: 1 We have spoken to many [citizens of country name] and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, religion, or gender, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being [nationality] , which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? 2 Table 1 summarizes data from 25,544 respondents sampled across 8 countries for this question, and compares this data to each country's polarization score. 3 The survey data indicate that: (i) there is considerable within-country variation in the share of respondents whose "first and foremost" identification lies with their ethnic group; (ii) in addition to within-country variance, there is also considerable cross-country variation in the share of respondents whose "first and foremost" identification lies with their ethnic group, ranging in round 1 from a high of 48% in Nigeria to lows of 13%, and 12% in Uganda and Zambia respectively; (iii) in comparing responses across rounds, the proportion of individuals who identify primarily with their ethnic group remains relatively stable in cases like Mali, Nigeria, and Zambia, whereas other cases display dramatic changes in ethnic salience, dropping in Zimbabwe from 47% to 13% and in Mali from 37% to 20%;
and (iv) a significant gap exists between measures of ethnic salience, on the one hand, and measures of ethnic polarization and politically relevant ethnic groups on the other hand.
[ Table 1 here]
Looking more specifically at the case of Nigeria, we disaggregate the 48% of respondents from round 1 who identified primarily with their ethnic group from the national to the state level. In the state of Akwa Ibom, located in southern Nigeria and comprised of 6 distinct but nonetheless related ethno-linguistic groups (the Ibbibo, Annang, Oron, Ibeno, Eket, and Efik ), 93.6% of respondents identified primarily with their ethnic group. In
Abia, another state in southern Nigeria inhabited by the Igbo, 86.3% of respondents identified primarily with their ethnic group. Clearly, the high level of salience attached to ethnicity in these states, as well as in the adjacent states of Bayelsa, Rivers, and Delta, is partly due to their location in the contentious Niger Delta Region and the ongoing dispute over oil production and revenue. In marked contrast, a mere 16.3% of respondents in Katsina and 18.4% of respondents in Kano, northern states inhabited predominantly by the Hausa and Fulani, identified primarily with their ethnic group.
Like Nigeria, South Africa also displays within-country variation in ethnic salience: disaggregated along provincial lines, the percentage of round 1 respondents who identified primarily with their ethnic group varied from a low of 5.1% in the Northern Province (Limpopo), 7% in the Northern Cape, and 7.5% in the Western Cape (regions with the highest percentages of respondents identifying primarily with race) to a high of 30% in the Eastern Cape and 41.3% in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Unsurprisingly, the Cape was created in the post-apartheid era out of two "independent" homelands for the Xhosa, whereas Kwa-Zulu Natal combined the pre-1994 province of Natal and various parts of KwaZulu Bantustan, home to the Zulu monarch. 4 In South Africa, considerable crosscountry variation in the aggregate share of respondents whose "first and foremost" identification lies with their ethnic group also exists across survey rounds, from 42% to 22% in rounds 1 and 2 respectively.
Taken together, the data support our claim that single summary statistics, like ethnic polarization, fail to effectively capture the heterogeneity of ethnic country-landscapes, papering over spatial and temporal variation in ethnic salience at the individual level. 
Polarization and Conflict
Few scholars would venture so far as to argue that ethnicity is not an important factor in civil conflict. Yet, contrary to expectations, the bulk of the quantitatively oriented literature fails to establish a clear association between ethnicity and civil war, even in wars that are commonly identified as "ethnic" wars. Using the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index, an aggregate measure of ethnic heterogeneity, these studies make one of the following arguments: (i) ethnic heterogeneity decreases the likelihood of civil war as coordination for rebellion becomes harder in more diverse societies (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) ; (ii) ethnic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of internal armed conflict, and to a lesser degree of civil war (Sambanis 2004, Hegre and Sambanis 2006) ; (iii) ethnic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of civil war, yet the effect is indirect (Blimes 2006) ; (iv) consistent with Horowitz (1985) , ethnic heterogeneity has a non-monotonic association with the outbreak of civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002 )-low when the population is ethnically homogeneous and extremely diverse, and high when divided into a few prominent ethnic groups; or (v) ethnic heterogeneity has no significant relationship with the outbreak of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin 2007). 6 Given the rather ironic ``diversity'' of these findings, a wave of recent scholarship on the link between ethnicity and civil war specifies more robust indexes, most centering on measures of ethnic polarization. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) , for instance, attribute the absence of a statistically significant relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the incidence of civil war specifically to the use of a fractionalizationindex. As an alternative, they specify the RQ-Index of polarization and they find that the relationship between polarization and civil war is now robust. They also find that an increase in polarization has a negative but indirect effect on economic growth by increasing the incidence of conflict and consumption and lowering investment (Montalvo and Querol 2005b). 7 Building upon this scholarship, Esteban and Ray (2008) find that measures of fractionalization and polarization tend to run in opposite directions: that conflict occurrence in polarized societies will be low whereas its intensity will be high, with the relationship reversed for highly fractionalized societies. As such, Esteban and Ray suggest that the relationship between fractionalization and conflict is non-monotonic, and that a mirror-image inverted pattern defines the relationship between polarization and conflict.
Others explore variants of the polarization-conflict link: Østby (2008) (Chandra 2001 (Chandra , 2006 appear to have been buried, if not altogether discarded.
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Our Approach
Multivariate statistical models exploring the significance of key predictor variables on the incidence of civil war have established numerous empirical regularities, although these studies are constrained by the use of different datasets, variation in the operationalization and measurement of key variables (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Ross 2006) , and a limited ability to specify underlying causal mechanisms (Humphreys 2005) given: (i) the large number of relevant causal factors; (ii) complicated interactions between agents and associated factors; (iii) the difficulty of collecting useful data on agent characteristics and behavior; and (iv) a small set of ``natural experiments'' to test the effects of varying factors. Moreover, the very characteristics of complex adaptive systems-agent heterogeneity and adaptation, nonlinear mechanisms and feedback loops, non-random interaction topologies, and path dependent dynamics-violate many of the assumptions underpinning the use of traditional large-N approaches. In the absence of adequate tools to deal with complex behavior, researchers are inclined to ignore these complexities, unnaturally limiting the scope of social research (Meyer et al., 2005) .
In contrast to multivariate approaches, we view the onset of civil war as influenced by a set of processes which interconnect political, economic, and social factors-a prime example of a complex adaptive system, in which many decision-making agents, each with their own characteristics and behaviors, interact with and change both the physical environment and other agents, leading to nonlinear and path-dependent dynamics. Agentbased models or ABM (Bankes, 2002; Bonabeau, 2002; Conte et al., 1997) are well suited to meeting the challenge of modeling a complex adaptive system because they are formal, unambiguous, replicable and testable (Axelrod, 1997; Axelrod and Cohen, 2001 )-lending themselves to study aspects of complex systems that are difficult to study using traditional analytic techniques (Parunak et al., 1998) . ABMs therefore provide powerful ways to develop, evaluate, and test theories by undertaking complex though experiments that would be difficult to conduct in the real world.
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Given the limited availability of individual-level data on ethnic salience, as well as the gap between this data and aggregate national-level data on the incidence of civil war, we utilize an ABM to analyze how the effect of ethnic polarization on the incidence of civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience at the individual level. In particular, we experiment with low and high levels of polarization, holding ethnic salience fixed at its maximum value. We then permit ethnic salience to vary across individuals as a function of relative group income, building on work which emphasizes the materialist and instrumentalist basis of ethnicity (Bates 1974 
The Computational Model
Our agent-based computational model is intrinsically a game between leaders of two nominally rival ethnic groups, one of which holds power and consequently serves as a target for takeover by the rival leadership. In contrast to a standard optimization problem in which a leader would maximize an objective function subject to constraints, we impose parameter values to define a leader's strategy set. We model, in other words, boundedly rational agents in a purposive effort to illustrate how sub-optimal spending and investment affect levels of conflict under different ethnic landscapes and a variety of natural resource regimes.
Conceptually, and at a higher level of abstraction, our model works as follows: at each timestep, rival leaders make spending and investment decisions; these decisions in turn generate revenue, affect territorial control and peasant support, and determine the emergence or progression of conflict which occurs when leaders seek to control the same cell(s); conflict, in turn, leads to new patterns of control over time. We consequently underscore the notion that patterns of spending and investment directly influence the instigation and spread of civil unrest by altering peasant support, the leadership's capacity to control territory, and by implication, its ability to wage conflict.
Our computational model is best conceived of as an exploratory device, one that may be used to understand key causal drivers and mechanisms underpinning the incidence of civil war in artificial landscapes or specific real-world cases by permitting the user to select different degrees of ethnic salience, different patterns of ethnic polarization and domination, a variety of resource profiles and agent strategies. As such, users may conduct complicated thought experiments for which empirical data would, in most cases, be difficult if not impossible to collect. For example, those interested in the behavior of key agents could explore how a ruler's ability to generate revenue through the taxation or looting of natural resources affects the onset and duration of civil war; those interested in understanding the micro-foundations of recruitment could focus on the conditions under which the opportunity cost faced by peasants for joining a rebellion increase or decrease;
while those interested in studying the effects of ethnicity on the incidence of civil war, as we are in this article, could formally study the consequences of different degrees of ethnic salience or different patterns of ethnic domination. and we underscore the importance of territorial control in this framework, given that control is a necessary condition for spending, investment, revenue generation, and popular support. All control is cell-specific, as is the breakdown of economic sectors, spending decisions, and peasant support. Conflict (component 9), also cell-specific, emerges when group leaders seek to control the same territory or cell.
[ and control has a non-monotonic effect on support (excessive control lowers support, as does weak or insecure control); (l) when support for the leader in control of a cell is weak, peasants may exercise the option to migrate to ethnic enclaves in an effort to find safety in numbers; (m) migration changes the calculus of control, and thus affects spending, investment, and support for leaders; 13 (n) conflict, which arises when leaders seek to control the same territory, alters the control of individual cells and may ultimately alter control of the state. [ Table 2 here]
We use the model to determine whether the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war is moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience-the importance that individuals attach to ethnicity as one among a number of identities. Levels of ethnic polarization, measured with the RQ-index, are specified by varying the relative size of rival ethnic groups (see Table 3 ). Ethnic salience, in turn, is initially "fixed," following the primordial notion that ethnicity is always salient for all individuals. We then relax this assumption, permitting ethnic salience to vary across individuals as a function relative income, such that the greater the disparity between a peasant's per capita income and the income of nominal rivals, the greater the salience she attaches to her ethnicity.
[ Table 3 here]
Experiments and Analysis

Experiments
We run four experiments using the computational framework described above. conflict onset consistently increases in so far as group A remains a clear majority. As members of the minority group compare their economic well-being with that of majority group members located in ever more distant parts of the landscape, ethnic salience and conflict increase. As the disparity in size between the minority and majority group narrows (RQ=0.99), however, the relationship between per-capita range and conflict onset changes direction. And once the two groups are equally sized (RQ=1), the relationship becomes less clear cut as the disparity between a peasant's local environment and the global environment (or entire landscape) increases significantly.
[ Table 5 here] The results, reported in Table 6 , indicate that minority domination does influence the incidence of conflict, and that the effect is sensitive to the specification of ethnic salience.
When ethnic salience is fixed, conflict onset increases with the level of polarization or size of the minority in power, peaking when the groups are close but not yet equal in size (RQ=0.99). In marked contrast, when ethnic salience is permitted to vary, conflict onset decreases as the level of polarization rises, or as the size of the minority approaches that of the majority group. These findings imply that the relationship between polarization and conflict onset is robust even under minority domination if one holds ethnic salience fixed. That said, the effect of minority domination on the incidence of conflict is greatest precisely when the minority is small (relative to the majority), when polarization is low and when ethnic salience is permitted to vary.
Turning to the other measures of conflict, we find that the number of conflict episodes increases with the size of the minority in power and is greater when ethnic salience is permitted to vary. An exception occurs when RQ=0.99, from which point on the number of episodes under fixed salience exceeds that under variable salience. Conflict duration displays a trend similar to that reported in experiments A and B until RQ=0.89, after which duration declines under both fixed and variable ethnic salience becoming equivalent (RQ-0.99), and then increases moderately when the rivals groups are equally sized (RQ=1).
[ Table 7 .
To begin with, we note that in all the cases examined in this experiment, total revenue is higher when ethnic salience varies, suggesting that the assumption of fixed ethnic salience effectively amplifies the negative (positive) effect of polarization on economic performance (conflict onset These findings suggest that the success or failure of economic policy generates conflict over revenue sharing, and that economic policy may succeed or fail regardless of the level of ethnic polarization.
[ Table 7 here] Conclusion Do levels of ethnic polarization effectively explain the incidence of civil conflict? Our response to this question is a qualified ``yes'', given that our findings point to ethnic salience as a key moderating variable in the polarization-conflict relationship. Using an agent-based computational model, we examine how the effect of ethnic polarization on the incidence of civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. This finding effectively suggests that the relationship between polarization and conflict onset could be robust even under minority domination, if and only if one holds ethnic salience constant. In addition, we find that the number of conflict episodes is likely to be greater under variable ethnic salience when minorities hold power, although this effect diminishes in magnitude and is then reversed as the rival groups approach parity.
And finally, our last experiment indicates that increasing polarization to its maximal level has a negative effect on economic performance under specific economic polices (i.e. robbery), with the effect amplified by the assumption of fixed ethnic salience. Given empirical evidence supporting the finding that a maximal level of polarization is negatively correlated with lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine 1997) and lower levels of participation in groups and associations (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) , it may be reasonable to posit that robbery (or other strategies that effectively generate this negative correlation) are more likely to be observed in the real world. That said, we find that under other economic policies (i.e. benevolent rule) increasing polarization to its maximal level has a positive effect on economic performance, leading us to conclude that while economic policy may succeed or fail regardless of the level of ethnic polarization, it is policy failure that generates conflict over revenue sharing. Thus, in contrast to the assertion that ethnic polarization has an indirect negative effect on growth because of the increased conflict risk and concomitant reduction in investment (Montalvo and Querol 2005b) , the causal arrow could run directly from economic policy to performance and conflict, with resulting conflict levels then moderated by ethnic polarization.
Our theoretical analysis has a significant, if relatively straightforward, implication for research on ethnicity and civil war: if indeed the importance individuals attach to their ethnic identities is a key determinant of conflict, then shifts in ethnic salience should assume center stage in explanations that link ethnicity to conflict. We therefore close with a call for scholars to find new and novel ways to bridge the gap between individual-level data on ethnic salience and aggregate data on conflict onset, episodes, and duration.
Recent work by Raleigh and Hegre (2005) , Buhaug and Rød (2006) , Cederman, Rød, & Weidmann (2006) , Dorussen (2007) , and Weidmann (2007) disaggregating civil conflict to the sub-national level constitutes a promising start in this direction. 2 Other identity categories for this question include religion, occupation/class, and gender. See Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, (2007) for a detailed discussion of the limitations associated with the use of this question to measure ethnic salience, including but not limited to issues related to the context specificity of respondent answers, idiosyncratic situational factors, the bias associated with self-reported identities, and the fact that the survey question explicitly bars respondents from describing themselves primarily in terms of their national identity, and the generalizability of the sample to the broader African context. Note also that the question we use was dropped from round 3 of the Survey.
3 The country index scores were taken from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) . 4 Nigeria and South Africa were not alone in this respect, with ethnic salience varying from lows of 11.1-pt highs of 68.4% across 8 regions including the capital district in Mali, from 12.5-84.4% across 15 districts in Malawi, and from 26.2-77.1% across 10 provinces in Zimbabwe.
5 Our analysis raises the question of whether an individual-level approach is useful for explaining group behavior? Our response is emphatically affirmative: (i) groups are not monolithic in their propensity to engage in violence against nominal rivals; (ii) groups are comprised of heterogeneous individuals who vary in their antipathy towards rivals, as well as in their willingness to bear the (high and often prohibitive) costs associated with violent behavior; (iii) group membership need not, therefore, determine the strength of individual attachment to ethnicity. That said, groups remain important in determining power relations, which in turn shape individual behavior. As a result, our framework captures both group (ethnic domination and polarization) and individual-level (ethnic salience) attributes associated with ethnicity. 6 The ELF measures the likelihood that two people chosen at random will not belong to the same ethnic group. Compiled by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s, the ELF is calculated using the Herfindahl concentration formula:
where i s is the share if group ) ,...., 1 ( n i i = .
8 Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2006) take exception to findings that support the polarization-conflict link, arguing instead that highly-polarized countries are no more likely to experience civil war than countries characterized by low levels of ethnic polarization, and suggesting that fractionalization not polarization is negatively associated with economic growth. Their argument centers on the coding and classification of conflict, highlighting the distinction between conflict incidence and conflict onset. Botswana was dropped due to the absence of meaningful ethnic cleavages. Note: Per Capita Range and Polarization are both specified as continuous variables. A sectoral and spatial spending strategy determines the share of revenue , allocates to (i) coercive power, (ii) robbery, (iii) economic investment, and (iv) social welfare payments to peasants, as well as the distribution of revenue across cells in the landscape.
1 A control strategy determines which cells on the landscape , seek to control, as well as the distribution of coercive power over these cells, as a function of the cell's (i) resource base, (ii) peasant population, (iii) distance to capital, (iv) proximity of other cells under the agent's control. The combination of spending and control strategies yield a set of stylized "modes of play" for , :
• Robbery is a "predatory" strategy in which leaders maximize personal profit by appropriating tax revenue from the economy, while neglecting further investment and relinquishing control of unprofitable areas.
• Social Welfare is a "populist" strategy designed to increase peasant support through high levels of social spending.
• Territorial Control is a "militant" strategy in which spending on coercive power to increase and/or maintain physical control over territory is paramount.
• Benevolent Rule is an "ideal" strategy in which leaders balance investment in the economy with spending on coercive power and social welfare.
Sectoral Spending Decisions
The spending strategy determines the share of revenue allocated to: (i) the expansion of coercive power (i.e. military spending); (ii) personal consumption; (iii) investment in the industrial extraction of resources (kimberlite or alluvial)-a mode of production that is easier to tax; (iv) investment in artisanal alluvial extraction, harder to tax but preferred by ; (v) investment in agricultural extraction, which may provide a lower rate of return compared to other economic sectors; and (vi) investment in welfare payments to peasants.
Spatial Spending Decisions
After allocating revenue across categories, a leader distributes these funds over grid cells by:
1. Assigning investment targets to every grid cell under his/her control: (a) In the kimberlite and alluvial industrial sectors, the target is the maximal investment allowed (b) In the alluvial artisanal sector, the target is proportional to the size of deposits available for artisanal mining (c) In the agricultural sector, the target is proportional to the number of peasants in the cell (d) With respect to social spending, the target is defined as the desired level of peasant sympathy (-10 for , +10 for )
1 Peasant revenue from social welfare is a function of the importance of the cell, and difference between actual and maximal levels of peasant support.
2. Distributing available funds in proportion to the difference between the targeted and the current level of investment in a cell.
Peasant Support and Migration
Next, we define a measure of peasant support for the "accountable agent" i.e. the leader in control of a given cell (Note that support need not be limited to leaders of one's own group, and that accountability is limited to leaders alone). This measure ranges from -10 to +10 (where -10 denotes total support for , +10 denotes total support for , and 0 denotes neutrality) and depends upon: (i) current revenue; (ii) changes in revenue over time; (iii) the coercive power of the "accountable agent"; and (iv) the ethnicity of the "accountable agent". Specifically, we take the difference between actual revenue and a reference revenue and the difference between and the past revenue . Let be weighted sum of past revenue:
Where represents the "length" of memory. It follows that as decreases, the rate at which a peasant "forgets" the past increases. We then specify a function which describes how peasant support is affected by the coercive power of the leader in control of a cell, such that begins at -1 for no coercive power, rises linearly to +1 for , falls linearly to -1 for , and remains at -1 for . This function is then weighted by a parameter . Lastly, support is affected by ethnic salience, such that if then equals -1 if the peasants and leader are from different groups, 1 if the peasants and leader are from the same ethnic group, and 0 if . Adding these terms, and inserting them into a logistic function yields:
where equals -1 for , +1 for , and 0 otherwise. The update rule for is:
where captures the "inertia" or the rate at which a peasant adapts her sympathy to changes in economic well being.
Finally, peasants may move or migrate to "ethnic enclaves" using the following rules: That is, if falls below 5 (-5), then peasant i will move a maximum distance m to a cell with the greatest number of co-ethnics , and highest degree of control exercised by a leader from the peasant's ethnic group. The migration of peasants has implications for control, given that high levels of peasant support lowers the cost of control, whereas this cost increases in the absence of strong support.
Conflict: Coercive Power, Control, and Civil War
Coercive power c is cell-and leader-specific, updated every timestep by new investment , depreciation (to reflect the normal wear of equipment and attrition), and loss l incurred as a result of conflict, and change in the density of "ethnicized" peasants (the number of peasants for whom ethnic salience e equals 1):
Control is a function of the average peasant support in the cell ( ), the coercive power ( and ) of leaders in the cell, and the cell's distance from the capital city, with -10 denoting complete control by of a cell and +10 denoting complete control by of a cell. The control strategy determines exactly which cells on the landscape , seek to control, as well as the distribution of coercive power over these cells, as a function of several cell specific characteristics. The first pertains to the existence of (kimberlite or alluvial) diamonds in the territoryin other words the expected revenue from extraction and taxation. Then there are characteristics of the population: whether a cell is densely populated, together with its ethnic composition. The third determinant of the control strategy is the distance from the capital, which imposes difficulties on government control, but facilitates insurgency or opposition. Lastly, , consider the proximity of a cell to cells already under their control. The strategy assigns a priority value v to every cell, based upon the following factors and associated weights given by :
• the existence of kimberlite/alluvial diamonds in the cell ( , )
• peasants population density ( )
• peasant ethnicity ( )
• distance from the capital ( , )
• proximity of , controlled cells ( , )
• average control value in the cell and neighboring cells ( , ) is in favor of , Based on these factors , ignore cells whose priority value v is lower than a priority threshold and ignore all cells already under their own control. Specifically, , choose n cells with the highest priority value, and build-up coercive power in these and neighboring cells. To determine control, we specify a control threshold , such that if , the cell falls under the control of , if , the cell falls under the control of , and for , the cell is not controlled by either , or . Specifically, we use the log ratio of coercive power and modify this ratio by adding the term (where is the number of peasants in the cell and is a constant):
As a result, the cost of shifting control increases with the size of the cell's peasant population. Next, we add to account for the influence of aggregate peasant sympathy on the balance of power in a cell, and to measure the effect of geography (where is the distance from the cell to the capital city, is the distance to the midpoint between the capital and the border, and is the distance between a border cell and the capital), to obtain:
